La r\u00e9volution num\u00e9rique actuelle, port\u00e9e par les algorithmes, l’intelligence artificielle ou encore le traitement des donn\u00e9es massives, transforme le monde de la justice notamment via l\u2019apparition des plateformes proposant des services juridiques en ligne. De par l\u2019innovation technologique sur laquelle elles reposent, ces legaltechs contribuent \u00e0 renouveler en profondeur l\u2019offre de prestations juridiques \u00e0 destination des justiciables. Le pr\u00e9sent rapport vise \u00e0 dresser un \u00e9tat des lieux des apports, limites et facteurs de risque associ\u00e9s \u00e0 ce renouvellement des pratiques, cet \u00e9tat des lieux \u00e9tant fond\u00e9 sur plusieurs analyses th\u00e9oriques mobilisant les outils et domaines standards de la micro\u00e9conomie (\u00e0 savoir l\u2019\u00e9conomie publique, l\u2019\u00e9conomie industrielle et la th\u00e9orie des jeux).
La premi\u00e8re partie de ce rapport s\u2019attache \u00e0 identifier les activit\u00e9s de ces nouveaux acteurs de la sph\u00e8re juridique, la structure du march\u00e9 sur lequel ils interviennent et la mani\u00e8re dont cette structure est modifi\u00e9e par leur intervention. D\u2019un point de vue normatif, il s\u2019agit d\u2019examiner dans quelle mesure la fourniture d\u2019un service public, celui de la justice, par des entit\u00e9s priv\u00e9es, les plateformes juridiques, peut impliquer une n\u00e9cessaire r\u00e9gulation par l\u2019\u00c9tat. La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une intervention publique n\u2019est pas uniquement li\u00e9e \u00e0 des consid\u00e9rations \u00e9thiques ou r\u00e9glementaires mais ob\u00e9it \u00e0 des pr\u00e9occupations purement \u00e9conomiques, qui sont fond\u00e9es sur la nature du march\u00e9 en question (caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 notamment par la pr\u00e9sence d\u2019externalit\u00e9s de r\u00e9seau et le fait que la justice n\u2019est pas un bien priv\u00e9).
Parmi ces pr\u00e9occupations, le march\u00e9 de la justice est naturellement caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 par l\u2019existence d\u2019asym\u00e9tries d\u2019information, entre les offreurs de services juridiques (avocats, notaires, etc.) et les demandeurs de tels services (les justiciables), asym\u00e9tries qui alt\u00e8rent l\u2019efficience du march\u00e9. Un service juridique poss\u00e8de ainsi les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u2019un bien de confiance qui peut \u00eatre \u00e0 l\u2019origine de comportements opportunistes du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l\u2019offre au d\u00e9triment de la demande. \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, comme nous l\u2019analysons dans la deuxi\u00e8me partie, l\u2019av\u00e8nement des plateformes juridiques en ligne, en tant que pourvoyeurs d\u2019information sur le march\u00e9, peut constituer une source d\u2019efficience (notamment en favorisant l\u2019acc\u00e8s au droit). Certaines conditions, relatives \u00e0 l\u2019organisation du march\u00e9, \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont l\u2019information est communiqu\u00e9e aux justiciables et au syst\u00e8me de tarification adopt\u00e9 par les plateformes consid\u00e9r\u00e9es, doivent cependant \u00eatre satisfaites et sont analys\u00e9es dans cette partie.
Dans la troisi\u00e8me et derni\u00e8re partie du rapport, nous \u00e9tudions les plateformes juridiques en tant que m\u00e9canismes extrajudiciaires de r\u00e9solution des litiges.
L\u2019analyse porte plus sp\u00e9cifiquement sur le cas de \u00ab Kleros \u00bb, une plateforme de justice d\u00e9centralis\u00e9e utilisant la technologie blockchain. Les litiges y sont enregistr\u00e9s sous la forme de \u00ab contrats intelligents \u00bb, cens\u00e9s permettre une automatisation de la justice, et le processus est fond\u00e9 sur le recours \u00e0 des jur\u00e9s r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9s en cryptomonnaie, dont les incitations \u00e0 prendre une d\u00e9cision impartiale sont fond\u00e9es sur les pr\u00e9ceptes de la th\u00e9orie des jeux. L\u2019analyse de ce type de proc\u00e9dure de r\u00e9solution des litiges montre n\u00e9anmoins que certaines pr\u00e9occupations existent, d\u2019ordre technique, juridique et comportemental. L\u2019impartialit\u00e9 des d\u00e9cisions est notamment sujette \u00e0 caution \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 les incitations et interactions \u00e0 l\u2019\u0153uvre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cette recherche est issue de l\u2019appel \u00e0 projet sur le th\u00e8me : <\/mark><\/strong> The current digital revolution, driven by algorithms, artificial intelligence and the processing of massive data, is transforming the world of justice, particularly through the appearance of platforms offering online legal services. Due to the technological innovation on which they are based, these legaltechs contribute to fundamentally renewing the offer of legal services for litigants. This report aims to draw up an inventory of the contributions, limits and risk factors associated with this renewal of practices, this inventory being based on several theoretical analyses mobilizing the standard tools and fields of microeconomics (i.e. public economics, industrial economics and game theory). The first part of this report seeks to identify the activities of these new players in the legal sphere, the structure of the market in which they operate and the way in which this structure is modified by their intervention. From a normative point of view, this involves examining to what extent the provision of a public service, that of justice, by private entities, legal platforms, can involve necessary regulation by the State. The need for public intervention is not only linked to ethical or regulatory considerations but follows purely economic concerns, which are based on the nature of the market in question (characterized in particular by the presence of network externalities and the fact that justice is not a private good). Among these concerns, the justice market is naturally characterized by the existence of information asymmetries, between providers of legal services (lawyers, notaries, etc.) and applicants for such services (litigants), asymmetries which alter market efficiency. A legal service thus has the properties of a confidence good which can be the source of opportunistic behaviour on the supply side to the detriment of demand. In this regard, as we analyse in the second part, the advent of online legal platforms, as providers of market information, can constitute a source of efficiency (in particular by promoting access to law). Certain conditions, relating to the organisation of the market, the way in which information is communicated to litigants and the pricing system adopted by the platforms in question, must however be satisfied and are analysed in this part. In the third and final part of the report, we study legal platforms as extrajudicial dispute resolution mechanisms. The analysis focuses more specifically on the case of \u201cKleros\u201d, a decentralized justice platform using blockchain technology. Disputes are recorded there in the form of \u201csmart contracts\u201d, supposed to allow automation of justice, and the process is based on the use of jurors paid in cryptocurrency, whose incentives to make an impartial decision are based on the precepts of game theory. The analysis of this type of dispute resolution procedure nevertheless shows that certain concerns exist, of a technical, legal and behavioural nature. The impartiality of decisions is particularly questionable given the incentives and interactions at work.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","disciplines":[114,2890],"collections":[119],"publication_tag":[1729,867,2892,1716,1475],"auteurs":[2891],"class_list":["post-10731","publications","type-publications","status-publish","hentry","disciplines-droit","disciplines-economie","collections-rapports-de-recherche","publication_tag-acces-a-la-justice","publication_tag-information","publication_tag-plateformes-juridiques","publication_tag-regulation","publication_tag-resolution-des-litiges","auteurs-yannick-gabuthy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Les enjeux de la construction d\u2019une justice pr\u00e9visionnelle dans un contexte d\u2019\u00e9mergence d\u2019un march\u00e9 des outils d\u2019intelligence artificielle<\/mark><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nEnglish version – R\u00e9sum\u00e9 en anglais<\/summary>\n